If anyone out there knows where Brian Cashman is, could you contact him and divert his attention to the New York Yankees, to whom he clearly must not be paying a whit of attention.
It really is hard to believe that Joe Girardi is left with no better DH option in a huge game than a Jayson Nix and his career slash line of .215/.284/.375.
Not that Chris Dickerson is an all-star or anything. But he is available, in the system, and better than Jayson Nix. It's not rocket science - make a roster move, demote the immortal Cody Eppley, or whatever.
Friday, August 31, 2012
Tuesday, August 28, 2012
Girardi: Hitting the Iceberg Is the Correct Play
The LoHud blog reported the following regarding how Jayson Nix's mental error allowed the winning run to score in the 11th inning of Monday night's game:
Everyone seemed to be in agreement that Jayson Nix did the right thing on that groundball in the 11th. "He didn’t have time to look the runner back,” Girardi said. “It was just a great baserunning play by McCoy."
Girardi's comment makes no sense. The infield was in - the main goal of the Yankee defense was to stop the run from scoring, not to prevent the hitter from reaching first on an infield single. Nix had to look the guy back; a third baseman cannot let the winning run score on a ground ball hit directly to him in that situation.
Contrast what Nix did to what Derek Jeter did on the play. The ever-alert Jeter ran over and covered third base, knowing that the play there is to hold the runner. Indeed, Jeter got there so quickly that if Nix had the instinct to throw, he may have nabbed McCoy.
What Girardi said about this debacle is like saying nothing could have been done to avoid the Titanic sinking; it was just a great collision event by the iceberg.
Everyone seemed to be in agreement that Jayson Nix did the right thing on that groundball in the 11th. "He didn’t have time to look the runner back,” Girardi said. “It was just a great baserunning play by McCoy."
Girardi's comment makes no sense. The infield was in - the main goal of the Yankee defense was to stop the run from scoring, not to prevent the hitter from reaching first on an infield single. Nix had to look the guy back; a third baseman cannot let the winning run score on a ground ball hit directly to him in that situation.
Contrast what Nix did to what Derek Jeter did on the play. The ever-alert Jeter ran over and covered third base, knowing that the play there is to hold the runner. Indeed, Jeter got there so quickly that if Nix had the instinct to throw, he may have nabbed McCoy.
What Girardi said about this debacle is like saying nothing could have been done to avoid the Titanic sinking; it was just a great collision event by the iceberg.
Thursday, August 23, 2012
Stay Off the Ledge
The Yankees' dismal display of baseball against the White Sox was depressing to watch. And it is even more depressing to see the Yanks' 10-game lead is mostly gone, with streaking and dangerous Rays now only 3 games behind.
But before jumping off the ledge, and/or making angry calls to WFAN, consider that the Yankees have a couple of advantages as the A.L. East race heats up.
The obvious advantage is the 3-game lead. While 3 games does not seem like much of a lead, with 38 games to go it gives the Yankees an opportunity to keep pressure on the Rays.
For example, let's suppose that the Rays stay hot and go 25-13; this would given them 94 wins. The Yankees could beat them out by going 23-15. This may not seem a huge difference, but the point is that if the Yankees play reasonably well, the Rays would have to have an extremely hot last quarter of the season to beat them out.
A second advantage is that the remaining schedule favors the Yankees in a few ways:
Obviously these advantages guarantee nothing; they merely represent an opportunity for the Yankees. So while obviously there is cause for consternation, the "glass half full" perspective is that after playing 3/4 of the season, the Yankees have built themselves a 3-game lead over the Rays while playing a tougher schedule.
But before jumping off the ledge, and/or making angry calls to WFAN, consider that the Yankees have a couple of advantages as the A.L. East race heats up.
The obvious advantage is the 3-game lead. While 3 games does not seem like much of a lead, with 38 games to go it gives the Yankees an opportunity to keep pressure on the Rays.
For example, let's suppose that the Rays stay hot and go 25-13; this would given them 94 wins. The Yankees could beat them out by going 23-15. This may not seem a huge difference, but the point is that if the Yankees play reasonably well, the Rays would have to have an extremely hot last quarter of the season to beat them out.
A second advantage is that the remaining schedule favors the Yankees in a few ways:
- 6 of the Yankees' remaining 38 games are against atrocious teams: the Indians and Twins. The Rays conversely play all their games against decent teams.
- In terms of games against non-A.L. East playoff contenders, the Rays have 13 games against the A's, White Sox and Rangers. The Yankees only have 3, against the A's.
- Overall, 25 of the A's remaining 38 games are against contenders; the Yankees however play only 16 against contenders. (This includes 6 Yankees-Rays games.)
Obviously these advantages guarantee nothing; they merely represent an opportunity for the Yankees. So while obviously there is cause for consternation, the "glass half full" perspective is that after playing 3/4 of the season, the Yankees have built themselves a 3-game lead over the Rays while playing a tougher schedule.
Saturday, August 11, 2012
A-Rod HR Watch, August Edition
It's been about almost 2 months since I last looked at whether A-Rod's 2012 HR statistics indicate a player in serious decline, so let's do an update.
If you haven't read the previous posts, this blog has been using binomial distribution as one way of gauging whether A-Rod's 2012 HRs are commensurate with a talent level of a player hitting HRs in 6.2% of his at-bats. 6.2% is used because that was A-Rod's HR rate over 2009-2010, when he hit 30 HRs each year (in less than full seasons).
So far we have found that A-Rod's HR numbers are in the range of what one would expect for someone at that talent level. He has been at the low end of that range - which makes gauging A-Rod's power an interesting enigma.
A-Rod now has 15 HRs in 352 ABs, for a 4.26 HR rate. 15 HRs again is within the expected range of a player with a talent level of hitting a HR in 6.2% of his ABs. The binomial distribution indicates that 95% of the time a player with that talent level should hit somewhere in the range of 15-30 HRs after 352 ABs.
15-30 HRs is a large range; one obviously would prefer a more precise estimate. However, the breadth of this range is instructive, because it shows the limitations of what we can know about a player's true talent after approximately 4 months of a season.
If you haven't read the previous posts, this blog has been using binomial distribution as one way of gauging whether A-Rod's 2012 HRs are commensurate with a talent level of a player hitting HRs in 6.2% of his at-bats. 6.2% is used because that was A-Rod's HR rate over 2009-2010, when he hit 30 HRs each year (in less than full seasons).
So far we have found that A-Rod's HR numbers are in the range of what one would expect for someone at that talent level. He has been at the low end of that range - which makes gauging A-Rod's power an interesting enigma.
A-Rod now has 15 HRs in 352 ABs, for a 4.26 HR rate. 15 HRs again is within the expected range of a player with a talent level of hitting a HR in 6.2% of his ABs. The binomial distribution indicates that 95% of the time a player with that talent level should hit somewhere in the range of 15-30 HRs after 352 ABs.
15-30 HRs is a large range; one obviously would prefer a more precise estimate. However, the breadth of this range is instructive, because it shows the limitations of what we can know about a player's true talent after approximately 4 months of a season.
Wednesday, August 8, 2012
Girardi's Gutty Move
The results look bad in the box score, but I thought Joe Girardi made a strong decision in pulling CC Sabathia after 6.2 innings in tonight's game, even though the Almighty Pitch Count was only 94.
Sabathia had worked hard over the previous couple of innings, which were extended by Robbie Cano and Casey McGehee errors. So it was reasonable for Girardi to bring in David Robertson's strong and solid arm, even though the move violated the conventional wisdom that You Leave Your Ace In the Game In Big Spots.
As the torturous bottom of the 7th dragged on, Michael Kay's frenzied bleatings about Pulling The Ace foreshadowed the second guessing Girardi would have to endure if the Yankees had lost. Girardi clearly was not afraid of the second-guessing; the safe move would have been to leave CC in.
Sabathia had worked hard over the previous couple of innings, which were extended by Robbie Cano and Casey McGehee errors. So it was reasonable for Girardi to bring in David Robertson's strong and solid arm, even though the move violated the conventional wisdom that You Leave Your Ace In the Game In Big Spots.
As the torturous bottom of the 7th dragged on, Michael Kay's frenzied bleatings about Pulling The Ace foreshadowed the second guessing Girardi would have to endure if the Yankees had lost. Girardi clearly was not afraid of the second-guessing; the safe move would have been to leave CC in.
Tuesday, August 7, 2012
Does Joe Girardi Ever Take a Struggling Starter Out Before He Is Shelled?
No.
See Ivan Nova's and Phil Hughes' start the last 2 nights as typical examples.
I'm talking here about the middle innings - 4th and 5th - when the starter is struggling enough that Girardi has someone warming up.
I am sick of seeing #28 stroll out to the mound after the struggling starter gives up the big hit while David Phelps is heating up.
Not sure why this happens so much; could Girardi be more concerned about the pitcher staying in long enough to get a decision? That seems unlikely; but once the 5th inning passes, Girardi's got a quick hook, so why does he manage the 5th inning so differently?
See Ivan Nova's and Phil Hughes' start the last 2 nights as typical examples.
I'm talking here about the middle innings - 4th and 5th - when the starter is struggling enough that Girardi has someone warming up.
I am sick of seeing #28 stroll out to the mound after the struggling starter gives up the big hit while David Phelps is heating up.
Not sure why this happens so much; could Girardi be more concerned about the pitcher staying in long enough to get a decision? That seems unlikely; but once the 5th inning passes, Girardi's got a quick hook, so why does he manage the 5th inning so differently?
Thursday, August 2, 2012
Assessing the Vazquez and Granderson Trades
In December of 2009 Brian Cashman made two trades with a lasting impact:
The WAR metric assesses these trades as follows:
- Obtained Javier Vazquez and Boone Logan for Arodys Vizcaino, Mike Dunn, and Melky Cabrera.
- Obtained Curtis Granderson for Ian Kennedy, Phil Coke, and Austin Jackson.
| Player | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Granderson | 3.5 | 7 | 2 | 12.5 |
| Kennedy | 2.4 | 5 | 2.4 | 9.8 |
| Coke | 1.1 | 2 | 0.6 | 3.7 |
| Jackson | 4.1 | 2.8 | 4.4 | 11.3 |
| Vazquez | -0.1 | - | - | -0.1 |
| Logan | 0.4 | 0.7 | 0.4 | 1.5 |
| Dunn | 0.1 | -0.1 | 0.5 | 0.5 |
| Vizcaino | - | 0.1 | - | 0.1 |
| Melky | -1 | 4.2 | 4 | 7.2 |
The WAR metric assesses these trades as follows:
- Granderson trade: the Yankees lost 12.3 wins.
- Vazquez trade: the Yankees lost 6.4 wins
- The total loss to the Yankees thus is 18.7 wins.
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